The United States’ Material Breach of the U.N. Headquarters Agreement and the Case for Permanent Relocation to Geneva

The United Nations exists to provide a universal forum where sovereign states deliberate as equals. This principle of universality is viable only if all Member States can access the Organization’s headquarters without political discrimination.

The 1947 Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the United States codified this principle. The U.S., as host state, pledged not to impede the transit of Member State representatives to and from U.N. headquarters. Yet recent events - notably the denial of visas to the Palestinian delegation in September 2025 and the revocation of Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s visa days later - show that the U.S. has failed to uphold this obligation. These are not isolated missteps but part of a political pattern targeting critics of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Such conduct constitutes a material breach of the Headquarters Agreement. Under international law, a material breach entitles the other party - in this case, the United Nations - to suspend or terminate its obligations. The General Assembly, exercising its authority under Article 20 of the U.N. Charter, should respond by permanently relocating its sessions to Geneva.

The Legal Case: Material Breach of the Headquarters Agreement

Article 13 of the Headquarters Agreement requires the United States to ensure unimpeded access for Member State representatives attending U.N. meetings. This obligation is absolute: it does not depend on the political content of a delegate’s speech or the bilateral relations between the U.S. and the delegate’s state.

Evidence of Breach in 2025

• Palestinian Delegation Visa Denials: The U.S. denied visas to Palestinian officials, including President Mahmoud Abbas, preventing in-person participation at the General Assembly. Abbas addressed the GA remotely on 25 September 2025.
• Revocation of President Gustavo Petro’s Visa: On 27 September, the U.S. revoked Petro’s visa shortly after he joined a pro-Palestinian rally in New York and criticized U.S. policy toward Israel.
• Broader Pattern: These actions fit a broader trend of U.S. willingness to obstruct delegations deemed politically inconvenient.

The 1988 precedent is clear: when the U.S. denied Yasser Arafat a visa, the General Assembly voted to hold its session in Geneva. This demonstrates both the U.S.’s capacity to breach its obligations and the Assembly’s authority to act.

Material Breach Under International Law

Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) defines a material breach as the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of a treaty’s purpose. The very purpose of the Headquarters Agreement is to guarantee universal access. Repeated visa denials and revocations directly undermine this.

The United Nations, as the non-breaching party, is entitled to consider the Agreement void.

The Authority of the General Assembly to Relocate

Article 20 of the U.N. Charter provides that the GA shall meet “at such time and place as it may determine.” This authority is independent of the Security Council; there is no veto over meeting locations.

Thus, the GA can adopt a resolution:

1. Declaring the U.S. in material breach of the Headquarters Agreement;
2. Affirming its authority to determine its place of meeting;
3. Relocating its sessions to Geneva.

Should the U.S. object, the dispute belongs before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Article 21 of the Headquarters Agreement already provides for arbitration and, failing that, ICJ jurisdiction. The GA itself could also seek an advisory opinion under Charter Article 96.

Practical Feasibility of Relocation to Geneva

Geneva already hosts the U.N. Office at Geneva (UNOG), the WHO, ILO, UNHCR, and many other agencies. The Palais des Nations hosted the GA in 1988 and has demonstrated scalability through major conferences, most recently UNCTAD16 in 2025.

Diplomatic Missions

Nearly all Member States already maintain permanent missions in Geneva. Relocation would require expansion, but costs would be offset by savings from closing or reducing New York offices, where real estate and living costs are far higher.

Host Country Framework

Switzerland has a long-standing legal framework for U.N. operations. An expanded host country agreement could be negotiated smoothly, given Geneva’s existing role as a U.N. hub.

The Costs to the United States

• Employment: The U.N. Secretariat employs 7,500–8,000 staff in New York, many U.S. citizens or residents. Their departure would directly cut local employment.
• Contractors: Catering, cleaning, transport, and conference service firms would lose significant contracts.

Diplomatic and Mission-Related Losses

• Permanent Missions: Closure or downsizing of ~190 diplomatic missions in New York would reduce demand for offices, apartments, and support services. Thousands of local employees would be affected.

Tourism and Hospitality

• GA Week: The annual influx of thousands of diplomats, media, and NGOs injects millions into New York’s hospitality and tourism sectors.
• Overall Contribution: Studies estimate the U.N. community generates $3.69 billion annually for New York’s economy, supporting roughly 16,000 jobs. Over a decade, cumulative losses would approach $40 billion.

Symbolic and Strategic Costs

• Loss of Soft Power: Hosting the U.N. gives Washington daily access to world leaders. Relocation would deprive it of this unique diplomatic advantage.
• Geopolitical Defeat: The move would be read as evidence that the U.S. cannot be trusted as a neutral host, undermining its claim to leadership of a rules-based international order.

Anticipating U.S. Counterarguments

• Sovereign Right to Control Borders: The U.S. may argue that visa decisions are sovereign acts. Yet by signing the Headquarters Agreement, the U.S. expressly limited its sovereignty in this context.
• Security Justifications: The U.S. could cite terrorism or public order. But systematic denial of critics, not security risks, betrays political intent.
• Budgetary Leverage: Washington may threaten to withhold its 22% contribution to the U.N. budget. But such threats would only reinforce perceptions of bad faith and could accelerate diversification of U.N. financing.

Roadmap for the General Assembly

1. Pass a Resolution condemning U.S. visa practices as a breach of the Headquarters Agreement and affirming GA’s authority to determine its meeting place.
2. Request an ICJ Advisory Opinion to strengthen the legal foundation for relocation.
3. Negotiate with Switzerland to expand the host country agreement for permanent GA sessions.
4. Phase Relocation beginning with the 2026 GA session in Geneva, then extending to other headquarters functions as needed.

Conclusion

The United States’ repeated obstruction of delegations through politically motivated visa denials and revocations is a material breach of the Headquarters Agreement. The General Assembly is not obliged to tolerate this. It has both the legal authority and the practical means to relocate its sessions to Geneva.

Such a relocation would impose billions in economic losses and a significant reputational defeat on the United States, while reaffirming the independence and universality of the United Nations. If the U.S. contests this decision, it may bring the dispute before the ICJ.

The time has come for the United Nations to act decisively. To safeguard its integrity, universality, and credibility, the General Assembly should permanently relocate to Geneva.